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1. The CISG was promulgated in 1980 by the UN Commission for International Trade Law
(“UNCITRAL”), and is sometimes also referred to as either the UNCITRAL or Vienna Convention on the
International Sale of Goods. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
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In an era of globalization it is perplexing that so many U.S. practitioners,
jurists, and legal academics continue to view contract issues as governed
exclusively by state common law and the Uniform Commercial Code. In
essence, a significant number of lawyers may be defaulting to the wrong law,
in the absence of an effective choice of law clause, when trying to determine
the rights and responsibilities arising out of international commercial
transactions. The object of the International Commercial Contracting Practices
Survey Project was to learn more about how and why this occurs.
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods (“CISG”)  and the UNIDROIT Principles of International1
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Apr. 11, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-99 (1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.uncitral.org/
pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/CISG.pdf.
2. The UNIDROIT Principles were first issued in 1994 and updated in 2004. INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (2004), available at http://www.UNIDROIT.org/english/principles/contracts/
main.htm.
3. Professor Michael Gordon, at the University of Florida, conducted an earlier study of attitudes
towards the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles among members of the Florida bar, judiciary and
academia a decade ago, which was one of the first attempts to assess and document the use of these
instruments in this country. M.W. Gordon, Some Thoughts on the Receptiveness of Contracts Rules in the
CISG and UNIDROIT Principles as Reflected in One State’s (Florida) Experience of (1) Law School
Faculty, (2) Members of the Bar with an International Practice, and (3) Judges, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 361
(1998). Other papers which touch upon the U.S. experience with these instruments include W.S. Dodge,
Teaching the CISG in Contracts, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 72, 74-78 (2000); M.F. Koehler & G. Yujun, The
Acceptance of the Unified Sales Law (CISG) in Different Legal Systems—An International Comparison
of Three Surveys on the Exclusion of the CISG’s Application Conducted in the United States, Germany,
and China, 20 PACE INT’L L. REV. (forthcoming 2008); G. Philippopoulos, Awareness of the CISG Among
American Attorneys, 40 UCC L.J. 357 (2008); C.S. Sukurs, Harmonizing the Battle of the Forms: a
Comparison of the United States, Canada, and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1481, 1511-15 (2001); and J. Ziegel, The Scope
of the Convention: Reaching Out to Article One and Beyond, 25 J.L. & COM. 59, 67-71 (2005).
4. The United States ratified the Convention in 1986, and the CISG entered into force on January 1,
1988. See CISG—Status, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_
status.html.
5. See generally CISG, supra note 1; L.F. Del Duca & P. Del Duca, Selected Topics Under the
Convention on International Sale of Goods (CISG), 106 DICK. L. REV. 205 (2001).
6. See Unilex Info, List of CISG Contracting States, http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?
Commercial Contracts  are examples of two significant international2
instruments that are relied upon much more often by those dealing in
commercial transactions outside of the country than by those here in the
United States. Apart from anecdotal discussion, there has been relatively little
examination of why this is the case.  Accordingly, the aim of the survey was3
to assess and document current opinions of U.S. practitioners, jurists, and
legal academics regarding the value and utility of these instruments, two
decades after the U.S. ratified the CISG,  and more than a decade after the4
promulgation of the UNIDROIT principles.
The CISG provides a comprehensive set of default legal rules governing
contract formation, the obligations of buyers and sellers, remedies for breach,
and a variety of other aspects of international commercial contracts for the
sale of goods, and therefore overlaps with a large part of the coverage of
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) in the U.S.  Seventy-one5
countries are contracting parties to the Convention. These include the United
States and, with the exception of the United Kingdom, virtually all of the
world’s major trading nations.  Nevertheless, after nearly twenty years of6
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dssid=2376&dsmid=13351&x=1. In addition to the United Kingdom, Japan was the other major trading
country that had long declined becoming a contracting party to the CISG. However, Japan’s accession to
the CISG is reportedly imminent, and may occur by the end of 2008. See H. Sono, Contract Law
Harmonization and Non-Contracting States: The Case of the CISG, 2-3 (2007), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/Sono_hiroo.pdf.
7. See Unilex Info, List of CISG Cases by Country—United States, http://www.unilex.info/
cases.cfm?pid=1&do=Country&cr=27#A649. Other databases, such as Westlaw or Lexis, report a slightly
higher number of cases involving the CISG, with fewer than 60 cases involving the CISG in U.S. courts.
See also CISG Database, Country Case Schedule—United States, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/
cisg/text/casecit.html#us (listing 96 such cases). Professor Ziegel suggests that a similar situation exists in
other common law countries as well. Ziegel, supra note 3, at 67-72.
8. Use of the CISG is becoming particularly common in cases and arbitral decisions in both China
and Russia. One commentator identified 320 cases from the People’s Republic of China that involved the
CISG, 268 of which were arbitral decisions before the China International; Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission (CIETAC). F. Yang, CISG in China and Beyond, 40 UCC L.J. 373, 375 (2008). Interestingly,
74 of these CIETAC decisions involved U.S. parties. Id. See also Ziegel, supra note 3, at 72; D. Saidov,
Cases on CISG Decided in the Russian Federation, 7 VINDOBONA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2003); and F.
Yang, The Application of the CISG the Current PRC Law and CIETAC Arbitration Practice, 2 NORDIC
J. COMMERCIAL L. 1 (2006), available at http://www.njcl.utu.fi/2_2006/article4.pdf. See generally CISG
Database, Country Case Schedule, available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/casecit.html.
9. See id.; U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics, Top Trading Partners—Total Trade, Year
to Date December, 2007, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top0712.html.
10. See UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 2. The Institute for the Unification of Private
International Law, commonly known by its French name as “UNIDROIT,” is an independent
intergovernmental institution initially established as an adjunct to the League of Nations.
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981).
12. See M.J. Bonell, UNIDROIT Principles 2004—The New Edition of the Principles of
International Commercial Contracts adopted by the International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law, 1 UNIFORM L. REV. 5, 7-8, 13-17 (2004).
experience, the CISG is rarely seen and perhaps even less frequently
understood by those engaged in commercial transactions in this country,
despite being as much a part of our domestic law as is the UCC. By one count,
the CISG appears in only fifty-six reported cases in the United States,  but7
figures much more prominently in judicial and arbitral decisions elsewhere
around the world.  This is particularly the case with China, which is this8
nation’s second largest trading partner right behind Canada.9
The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts,
promulgated by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law,10
are intended to reflect generally accepted aspects of commercial contract law
drawn from a variety of different legal systems, and to function much like an
international equivalent of the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the
Law of Contracts.  However, in addition to serving as a guide to contract11
interpretation, the Principles have also become important as a model for the
domestic law of several countries.  In the United States, however, the12
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13. See Unilex Info, List of UNIDROIT Principles Cases by Country—United States,
http://www.unilex.info/cases.cfm?pid=2&do=country&cr=17#A41. However it should also be noted that,
given the nature of the UNIDROIT Principles, they are arguably more likely to be used in arbitral
proceedings than litigation. Moreover, as many arbitral decisions are unpublished, the total number of
decisions referring to the Principles in some form is likely to be understated by the figure found in the
above-referenced citation, or any other, database.
14. Gordon, supra note 3.
15. See U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics, U. S. Exports of Goods by State, ZIP Code
Based, by NAICS-Based Product Code Groupings, Not Seasonally Adjusted: December 2006 and
Cumulative to Date, 2006, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/state/zip/2006/12/zipstate.pdf
16. However, it should be noted that the Census Bureau does not track import data in the same
fashion as it tracks export data. Accordingly, Hawaii is in the somewhat anomalous position of having very
few exports, and therefore ranking quite low in the government’s statistical summary, but obviously being
heavily dependent upon imports. Nonetheless, it was felt that it was important to have another West Coast
state represented in the survey, and Hawaii has the lowest reported trade volumes of those states. See id.
17. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
18. Zoomerang Home Page, http://info.zoomerang.com/.
Principles are perhaps even less familiar than the CISG. The UNIDROIT
Principles appear in only one reported case and one arbitral decision in the
U.S.13
The International Contracting Practices Survey Project expands upon the
work of Professor Michael Gordon at the University of Florida, who surveyed
attitudes towards these instruments in Florida ten years ago in connection with
his report to the XVth International Congress of Comparative Law.  In14
addition to Florida, this new survey specifically sought responses from four
other jurisdictions, including two additional top exporting states, California
and New York, and two at the bottom of the U.S. Census Bureau’s list of
exporting states, Hawaii and Montana.  One reason for targeting these15
particular jurisdictions, in addition to enlarging the sample area, was to see if
there were significant differences in the opinions expressed by those in states
with substantial international dealings as compared to those in states with
relatively little international trade.  Additionally, while particular emphasis16
was placed upon obtaining responses from these five target jurisdictions, the
survey was open to other participants as well. Accordingly, responses were
received from 23 U.S. jurisdictions and 15 foreign countries or regions by the
time the survey was closed.17
SURVEY METHODOLOGY
The survey was conducted entirely online, using the Zoomerang online
survey hosting service,  although the initial “welcome” page that provided18
entry to the actual survey was hosted on the Stetson University College of
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19. The ten basic questions asked of all participants are found in Part I of the Appendix, Questions
1-10, infra.
20. The nine additional questions specifically directed to practitioners are found in Part II of the
Appendix, Questions 11-19, infra.
21. The eight additional questions specifically directed to judges are found in Part III of the
Appendix, Questions 20-27 infra.
22. The seventeen additional questions specifically directed to law professors are found in Part IV
of the Appendix, Questions 28-44, infra.
23. The final question asked of all participants is found in Part V of the Appendix, Question 45,
infra.
24. In the case of New York, which does not have a unified bar, the invitations were sent to the
section chairs of the New York State Bar Association. Additionally, as Montana does not have an
International Law Section, their invitations were sent to the Business Law Section and the President of the
Law website. While it was recognized that employing an electronic tool could
adversely impact a potential respondent’s willingness to participate, it was
also thought that the converse might be true—that the ability to access and
quickly respond to the survey online might result in a greater response from
busy practitioners, jurists, and academics than with a hardcopy survey.
Moreover, it was assumed that most practitioners and academics, and many
judges, would now be much more comfortable with electronic tools,
computers, and the Internet than was the case a decade ago. Accordingly,
when combined with the ability to cost effectively collect, collate, and analyze
the data in an electronic form, the decision was made to use an online tool for
this survey project.
Each participant was asked to respond to between 20 and 38 questions,
depending upon their responses. There were ten basic questions asked of all
participants.  These were followed by questions specifically directed at19
practitioners,  jurists,  and legal academics.  The online tool would present20 21 22
only the appropriate questions to any individual participant based upon that
participant’s self-identification as a member of one of these groups. Finally,
there was an open ended question for each participant that closed the survey
by inviting any other pertinent comments or observations the participants
might care to offer.  Apart from declaring one’s professional occupation and23
home jurisdiction, no personally identifiable information was collected from
any of the survey participants and all responses remain entirely anonymous.
A variety of means were used to solicit input and encourage participation
in the survey project. In order to obtain responses from practitioners, email
invitations with links to the online survey were sent to the chairs of both the
Business Law and International Law Sections of the bar in each of the five
target jurisdictions, with a request that they publicize or redistribute the survey
invitation to their membership.  Additional requests were sent to the ABA24
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Montana Bar Association.
25. See AALS Section on Contracts—Listserv, http://www.aalscontracts.com/activities/listserv.html.
26. See Chicago-Kent College of Law center for Law and Computers—Mailing List Information,
http://www.kentlaw.edu/clc/mailing_lists/listoflists.shtml.
27. See ASIL International Economic Law Interest Group, http://www.asil.org/economiclaw/
index.html.
28. Appendix, Question 1, infra.
29. Among the 75 respondents who stated they were located outside of the five target jurisdictions,
32 practitioners and 18 law professors listed other states in the United States. One law professor simply
International Law Section and the International Business Law Committee of
the ABA Business Law Section. Similar emails and follow-up letters were
sent to the court administrators and to the Chief Judge or Chief Justices of the
highest courts in California, Florida, Hawaii, Montana, and New York, in an
effort to obtain input from members of those states’ judiciary, and individual
letters were sent to each of the 363 federal District Judges or Magistrates in
those states. In order to obtain input from academics, each of the 321 law
professors shown as teaching either Contracts or Commercial Law at a school
in one of the target jurisdictions in the 2006-2007 AALS Directory of Law
Teachers also received an individual email invitation to participate in the
survey, and general invitations were posted on the AALS Section on Contracts
(AALSCONTRACTS),  the Law Professors and Lecturers (LAWPROF),25 26
and the ASIL International Economic Law Interest Group
(ASIL_ECONOMICIG)  email listservs. The CISG/UNIDROIT Principles27
Survey was opened at the beginning of August 2006, and closed for any
further responses at the beginning of May 2007.
SURVEY RESULTS
Survey Part I: General Questions Addressed to All Participants
Participants and Background
A total of 236 individuals responded to the survey, with 66% of the
responses coming from practitioners, 7% from jurists, and 27% from legal
academics.  The majority of the responses, 68%, came from the five target28
jurisdictions of California, Florida, Hawaii, Montana, and New York.
However, 22% of the practitioners or academics who responded were located
in other U.S. jurisdictions, and 10% came from foreign jurisdictions.
Altogether, responses were received from 22 states, the District of Columbia,
and 15 foreign countries or regions.29
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declared “I do not practice” and is included among the “Other U.S.” respondents throughout these survey
results. Together these 51 individuals amount to 22% of all respondents. A further 21 practitioners and 3
law professors, accounting for 10% of all respondents, declared that they were located in a foreign country
or region. Appendix, Question 2, infra.
30. Appendix, Question 3, infra.
31. Appendix, Question 4, infra.
32. Appendix, Question 3, infra, Response from Law Professors.
33. Appendix, Question 4, infra, Response from Law Professors.
34. Gordon, supra note 3, at 364. Law professors in Florida in the current survey expressed even
higher levels of familiarity with both the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles. Among legal academics in
Florida 93% said they were “thoroughly” or “moderately” familiar with the CISG, and 57% were similarly
familiar with the Principles. Appendix, Question 4, infra, Response from Law Professors in Florida.
35. Appendix, Question 3, infra, Response from Practitioners. This figure increases to 34% if the
survey responses from foreign practitioners are also considered. Id.
36. Appendix, Question 4, infra, Response from Practitioners. This figure increases to 20% if the
survey responses from foreign practitioners are also considered. Id.
37. Gordon, supra note 3, at 368. However, practitioners in Florida in the current survey reported
significantly higher levels of familiarity with the CISG, and to a lesser degree also with the UNIDROIT
Principles than what Professor Gordon observed. Among practitioners in Florida 71% reported they were
Basic Familiarity with the CISG and UNIDROIT Principles
All the survey participants were asked to complete the ten questions in
Part I, which were aimed at generally assessing their basic familiarity with the
CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles. Each participant was initially asked to
declare whether they considered themselves “thoroughly,” “moderately,”
“somewhat,” or “not at all” familiar with both the CISG and the UNIDROIT
Principles. Most participants were more aware of the CISG than the
UNIDROIT Principles, with 43% declaring that they felt “thoroughly” or
“moderately” familiar with the CISG  whereas only 26% made the same30
statements regarding the UNIDROIT Principles.31
Law professors claimed the greatest familiarity with both the CISG and
the UNIDROIT Principles, with 75% declaring that they were “thoroughly”
or “moderately” familiar with the CISG  and 43% similarly familiar with the32
UNIDROIT Principles.  While the law professors’ familiarity with the CISG33
is comparable to what Professor Gordon observed in 1996, this represents a
significant improvement in awareness of the UNIDROIT Principles which
were largely unknown at the time of the earlier survey.34
U.S. practitioners reported much lower comparable levels of familiarity
of 30% regarding the CISG  and 17% regarding the UNIDROIT Principles.35 36
This almost precisely matches what Professor Gordon observed in Florida a
decade ago.37
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“thoroughly” or “moderately” familiar with the CISG, and 36% were similarly familiar with the Principles.
Appendix, Question 4, infra, Response from Practitioners in Florida.
38. Gordon, supra note 3, at 369-70. At the time of Professor Gordon’s survey, there were no
reported cases in Florida that involved either the CISG or the UNIDROIT Principles, and virtually all of the
judges who responded were ignorant of these instruments.
39. Appendix, Question 3, infra, Response from the Judiciary.
40. Appendix, Question 4, infra, Response from the Judiciary.
41. See Appendix, Questions 3 and 4, infra, Response from Practitioners.
42. See Martin F. Koehler, Survey Regarding the Relevance of the United Nations Convention for
the International Sale of Goods (CISG) in Legal Practice and the Exclusion of its Application (Oct. 2006),
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/koehler.html. Koehler examined the reasons offered by 81 German
and American practitioners for excluding the application of the CISG from international contracts. Several
comments Koehler received from American lawyers in response to his survey were to the effect that their
clients could not be dissuaded from application of “national” law because their companies were unfamiliar
with the CISG. See also Gordon, supra note 3, at 363. Professor Gordon reports on a judge in Miami who
refused to believe the U.S. signed a treaty that could supersede the state’s adoption of the UCC, and another
judge in Tampa who similarly indicated that while the CISG might be intended to apply in federal courts,
he would not apply it in his court. See also V. Susanne Cook, The U.N. Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods: A Mandate to Abandon Legal Ethnocentricity, 16 J.L. & COM. 257 (1997).
Also, much as Professor Gordon found,  the judiciary was at the other38
end of the scale, with 82% declaring that they were “not at all familiar” with
the CISG,  and 88% declaring they were similarly unfamiliar with the39
UNIDROIT Principles.40
Comparing the responses from California, Florida, and New York, with
those obtained from Hawaii and Montana, shows a striking difference in the
reported levels of awareness of these instruments among the practitioners.
Only a single practitioner in the low exporting states indicated even a
“moderate” level of familiarity with the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles,
as compared to the 26 who were familiar with the CISG or the 13 who were
familiar with the Principles in the top exporting states.41
These responses suggest that the CISG, in particular, continues to be
misperceived as a “foreign law” and of relatively little concern to U.S.
practitioners and judges. Other commentators have anecdotally observed this
manifested in two respects, either in a tendency to view the CISG as not being
part of the contract law of the United States at all, or as being confined to
federal law and of concern only in large international commercial contracts.42
Comments from two of the survey participants further illustrate these
attitudes. A practitioner in Montana wrote:
Some uniform international standards for contracts are probably important; however,
U.S. law should govern contracts performed in the United States. Our laws tend to be fair
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43. Appendix, Question 45, infra, Response from Practitioners.
44. Id.
45. See CISG supra note 1, Article 1, which reads:
(1) This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business
are in different States:
(a) when the States are Contracting States; or
(b) when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of a Contracting
State.
(2) The fact that the parties have their places of business in different States is to be disregarded
whenever this fact does not appear either from the contract or from any dealings between, or from
information disclosed by, the parties at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract.
(3) Neither the nationality of the parties nor the civil or commercial character of the parties or of
the contract is to be taken into consideration in determining the application of this Convention.
See also Asante Technologies, Inc. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1147 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
The suspicion if not outright hostility towards the CISG reflected in these respondents’ comments is not
confined just to practitioners. In one of the very early U.S. decisions involving the Convention, U.S. District
Judge Brieant wrote that “the State Department undertook to fix something that was not broken by helping
to create the Sale of Goods Convention which varies from the Uniform Commercial Code in many
significant ways.” Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
46. Appendix, Question 5, infra.
with appropriate recourse for all parties involved. We should not be so willing to place
this responsibility in the hands of an international body.43
Another practitioner from one of the top exporting states, New York,
similarly opined: “I am not sure the country is ready to surrender states’ rights
sufficiently to warrant accepting an international convention, except with
multinational entities.”  Both of these views are seriously mistaken, but44
nonetheless notable twenty years after the U.S. ratification of the CISG. The
CISG is part of the domestic law of contracts in every state in the United
States, fully applicable by its own terms, and therefore provides the default
legal rules applicable to international transactions between businesses located
in countries that are party to the Convention.45
Background and Training in CISG and UNIDROIT Principles
Two-thirds of the survey participants who claimed some degree of
familiarity with either the CISG or the UNIDROIT Principles indicated they
gained that knowledge through individual research in books, law journals, or
professional magazines. Formal law school courses came in a distant second
as a source of that knowledge, identified by only 29% of the respondents,
followed by 23% who gained their familiarity with these instruments through
online research in sources other than Westlaw or Lexis.  Participation in46
litigation or arbitral proceedings was also an important source of learning for
10 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 27:1
47. Id. Responses from Practitioners, the Judiciary, and Law Professors.
48. Id.
49. Appendix, Question 6, infra.
50. Id.; Responses from Law Professors.
51. Id.; Responses from Practitioners.
52. Id.; Response from the Judiciary.
practitioners and legal academics and, as would be expected, the predominant
source of information for U.S. jurists.  Continuing legal education programs47
were the least common source of information identified by practitioners and
academics.48
However, 72% of the survey participants indicated that the CISG should
be taught in CLE programs, 66% thought it should be included in advanced
law school courses, 50% thought it should be covered in basic law school
Contracts or Sales courses, and 37% advocated specialized training for the
judiciary. Only 6% of the respondents felt that additional formal training or
education regarding the CISG was unnecessary.49
As a group, law professors were the strongest advocates of additional
formal education regarding the CISG, with 78% supporting its inclusion in
advanced law school courses, and 67% in favor of addressing the CISG in a
basic Contracts or Sales course. Three quarters of the law professors also
favored including the CISG in CLE programs, and 59% supported its inclusion
in specialized training programs for the judiciary. Interestingly, three of the
professors responding to this question, 5% of the total, were among those who
felt no additional education on the CISG was necessary at this time.50
Practitioners were similarly in favor of increased formal training, 62%
indicating the CISG should be part of advanced law school courses, with 43%
of U.S. practitioners—and 69% of the foreign practitioners
responding—urging that it be addressed in basic law school courses.
Furthermore, 72% of practitioners wanted to see the CISG covered in CLE
programs, and more than a quarter recommended it for specialized training for
the judiciary.51
The judiciary was also generally supportive of additional formal training
in the CISG, with 50% supporting its inclusion in advanced law school
courses, 30% supporting addressing the CISG in basic Contracts or Sales
courses, 60% suggesting it was an appropriate subject for CLE programs, and
30% of the judges wanting to see the CISG included in specialized training for
the judiciary.52
The responses indicated a similar pattern advocating addressing the
UNIDROIT Principles in both advanced law school courses and CLE
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53. Appendix, Question 7, infra.
54. See id., Response from Practitioners and Law Professors.
55. Appendix, Question 8, infra.
56. Gordon, supra note 3, at 368-69.
57. Appendix, Question 8, infra, Response from Practitioners.
programs, and to a lesser degree in basic Contracts or Sales courses and
specialized training programs for the judiciary, albeit with lower levels of
support. Two-thirds of the respondents indicated the UNIDROIT Principles
should be addressed in advanced law school courses, 63% supported their
inclusion in CLE programs, 35% in basic law school courses, and 26% in
specialized training programs for the judiciary. The number of those who felt
additional formal education in the UNIDROIT Principles was unnecessary at
this time was 10%, or nearly double that seen with regard to the CISG.  As53
with the similar question regarding the CISG, however, legal academics and
foreign practitioners were again the leading proponents of further formal
education regarding the UNIDROIT Principles.54
Interpretation of “Choice of Law” Clause Invoking the CISG
Each of the survey participants was then asked to interpret the meaning
of a choice of law clause in an international commercial sales contract
between parties in different CISG signatory states which read, “the law of
(insert name of your jurisdiction) shall apply.”
While 48% said that meant the CISG would apply to the contract as part
of the law of their jurisdiction, 40% of the respondents indicated that the UCC
would either apply in lieu of, or prevail over, the application of the CISG.55
This is roughly comparable to what Professor Gordon found with a similar
query to Florida practitioners in his 1996 survey.56
This result does not appear to be substantially affected by the volume of
export related activity in the respondents’ jurisdiction. Only 50% of
practitioners in California, 53% in Florida, and 28% in New York—all high
volume exporting states—selected the CISG as the applicable law in this
question. In the low volume exporting states, 40% of the practitioners in
Hawaii and 25% of the practitioners in Montana similarly selected the CISG
as the applicable law. In comparison 62% of the foreign practitioners selected
the CISG as the applicable law.57
The judiciary’s response to this question, however, was different from a
decade ago. In Professor Gordon’s survey 90% of the judges would apply the
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58. Gordon, supra note 3, at 370.
59. Appendix, Question 8, infra, Response from the Judiciary. However, it should also be noted that
the response rate by the judiciary to some of the survey questions, such as this one, are quite low. In part
this may reflect a concern several judges expressed as to whether portions of the survey posed issues
regarding their obligation to refrain from providing advisory opinions. See infra notes 93-96 and
accompanying text.
60. Appendix, Question 8, infra, Responses from Law Professors.
61. See CISG, supra note 1, Arts. 6 and 12. Article 6 provides that “[t]he parties may exclude the
application of this Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its
provisions.” Article 12 provides each contracting state with the ability to make reservations to certain
provisions of the CISG and still remain a party to the Convention.
62. Asante Technologies, Inc. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (N.D. Cal. 2001); BP Oil
Int’l v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 2003); Valero Mktg. v. Greeni
Oy, 373 F. Supp. 2d 475, 482 (D.N.J. 2005); Am. Mint LLC v. GOSoftware, Inc., C.A. No. 1:05-CV-650,
2006 WL 42090, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2006). But see Am. Biophysics v. Dubois Marine Specialties, 411
F. Supp. 2d 61 (D.R.I. 2006).
63. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
64. RALPH FOLSOM, 1 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 1.5 (2d ed. 2007). Professor
Folsom goes on to suggest, as an example, “This contract shall not be governed by the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1980, but shall be governed by the New York
Uniform Commercial Code for domestic sales of goods and other New York Laws.” Id.
UCC when presented with such a clause,  whereas only 36% of the judges58
responding to the current survey would apply the UCC in lieu of the CISG in
such a case, and 18% affirmatively selected the CISG as the law governing
such a contract.59
Among law professors, 59% identified the CISG as the applicable law,
but 39% of all law professors—including 29% of those in California, 21% of
those in Florida, and 45% of those in New York—believed the UCC would
either apply or prevail in the event of any inconsistency with the CISG.60
None of these results are particularly encouraging. While CISG Article
6 does permit the parties to derogate from any part of the Convention, or to
exclude the application of the Convention altogether,  the CISG is a self-61
executing treaty and therefore part of the domestic law of the United States.
Simply choosing the law of a particular state in a choice of law clause should
not act as an implied exclusion of the CISG.  Moreover, as a treaty, the CISG62
prevails over any inconsistent state law, such as the UCC, as a matter of
federal preemption under the supremacy clause of the Constitution.  As63
Professor Ralph Folsom advises, “if the parties decide to exclude the
Convention, it should be expressly excluded by language which states that it
[the CISG] does not apply and also [affirmatively] states what law shall
govern the contract.”64
Accordingly, it would appear that a substantial number of the survey
participants are as unclear as to the actual scope and application of the CISG
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65. Appendix, Question 9, infra. However, more judges (27%) than practitioners (19%) or
academics (10%) were willing to find that such a clause calls for the exclusive application of the
UNIDROIT Principles to the parties’ obligations. Id.
66. Id.
67. Appendix, Question 10, infra.
68. Only 5% of law professors would declare such a clause ineffective in the context of arbitration
versus 16% in the context of litigation. Compare Appendix, Question 10, infra, Response from Law
Professors, with Appendix, Question 9, infra, Response from Law Professors.
as they were a decade ago. This also shows the persistent adverse effect of the
misconception of the CISG as a distinctly “foreign” body of law rather than
an integral part of our domestic contract law.
Interpretation of “Choice of Law” Clause Invoking the UNIDROIT
Principles
The final two questions in Part I attempted to similarly explore the
meaning of a contract clause which read “this contract will be governed by the
UNIDROIT Principles” both in the context of litigation and in an arbitral
proceeding. Given the nature of the UNIDROIT Principles as something akin
to an international restatement of the law rather than as a collection of hard
legal rules, and the lack of U.S. case law involving the Principles, whether
such a clause represents an “a-national” choice of law or is simply a reference
to the lex mercatoria or general principles of law is a much more open
question.
More than a third of the survey participants felt that the inclusion of such
a clause means that in any litigation over the parties’ contractual rights, those
rights would be determined solely by the UNIDROIT Principles except to the
extent that the Principles were inconsistent with the mandatory law of the
forum in which the case was heard.  However, 21% believed that applicable,65
non-mandatory, national or state law would still apply, as modified by the
UNIDROIT Principles. An equal number, 17%, were at either end of the
spectrum, believing either that the parties successfully invoked the exclusive
application of the UNIDROIT Principles, or that the parties had completely
failed to make any effective choice of law. Only 11% would interpret such a
clause as calling for the use of the Principles to simply supplement or explain
the otherwise applicable national or state law.66
Asking the same question in the context of an arbitral proceeding
produced much the same results, but with a higher general level of support for
each option.  However, the law professors were significantly less willing to67
declare the clause ineffective in an arbitration proceeding than in litigation,68
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69. In the context of arbitration 30% of jurists would look exclusively to the UNIDROIT Principles
to decide the case under such a clause versus 27% who would do so in the context of litigation. Compare
Appendix, Question 10, infra, Response from Judiciary, with Appendix, Question 9, infra, Response from
Judiciary.
70. These figures are based upon the 47 U.S. respondents who addressed the substance of this
question. Another 43 U.S. survey participants said that this particular question was not applicable to their
practice. See Appendix, Question 11, infra.
71. See, e.g., Koehler, supra note 42, at 2. More than 70% of U.S. respondents in Koehler’s survey
said they routinely excluded the CISG in their contracts. Id.
72. Only 1 of 4 respondents in California would completely opt out of the Convention’s coverage,
and the sole respondent from Montana who addressed the substance of this question indicated he or she
specifically opts into the CISG. In both Florida and New York the majority of respondents would opt out
of the Convention’s coverage, and there was no substantive response to this question from practitioners in
Hawaii. See Appendix, Question 11, infra. Comparable responses were reported by foreign practitioners,
with 56% of the 16 foreign survey participants who addressed the substance of the question reporting that
they opt out of the CISG, 25% indicating that they opt into the Convention in whole or in part, and 19%
stating they make no reference to the CISG at all in their contractual documents. See id.
and the judges were marginally more willing to look exclusively to the
UNIDROIT Principles for their decisional rules when dealing with
arbitration.69
Survey Part II: Questions Addressed to Practitioners
Each of the practitioners was then asked to respond to a number of
questions aimed at examining their actual use of the CISG and the UNIDROIT
Principles and their perception of the utility of these instruments.
Addressing the CISG in Contracts
When drafting international commercial contracts, 55% of U.S.
practitioners who said they were familiar with the CISG specifically choose
to opt out of its coverage, while 24% specifically opt in to the CISG in whole
or in part. However, 21% do not address the Convention at all in their
agreements.  This is consistent with other studies that found a comparable,70
or even higher, tendency for U.S. practitioners to opt out of the CISG in whole
or in part.71
While the clear trend was to generally opt out of the CISG, practitioners
in both California and Montana indicated they were more likely to opt into the
Convention’s coverage (at least in part) than to opt out, so again the relative
amount of export related business conducted in a given jurisdiction does not
appear determinative of the approach taken. Interestingly, only 12% of72 
practitioners indicated that they had argued for, and 3% argued against, the
2008] INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTING PRACTICES SURVEY PROJECT 15
73. See Appendix, Question 15, infra. By a 2:1 margin the California practitioners indicated that
they would argue for the CISG’s application as the default law for the transaction when the parties’
documents did not contain an effective choice of law clause. See id. This is in line with the other survey
results which showed that 75% of practitioners in California would be likely to affirmatively opt into the
CISG’s coverage. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. The two practitioners in Florida who
responded to the substance of this question also declared that they argued for the application of the CISG
when the parties’ documents did not contain an effective choice of law clause. See Appendix, Question 15,
infra. This despite the fact that the majority of Florida’s practitioners said they would typically opt out of
the CISG’s coverage when drafting contracts. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
74. These figures are based upon the 45 U.S. respondents who addressed the substance of this
question. Another 43 U.S. survey participants said that this particular question was not applicable to their
practice. See Appendix, Question 12, infra. One California practitioner criticized the premise and structure
of this question, explaining that his or her decision to opt in or out of the CISG’s coverage was made on
a case-by-case basis. Another practitioner—outside of the five target jurisdictions—offered the equally
meritorious observation that “internal legal department and contract managers are looking for consistency
in . . . their contracts. . . . They do not have the time . . . to try to determine whether the CISG and
UNIDROIT principles might actually be favorable in a particular situation.” Appendix, Question 45, infra,
Response from Practitioners.
75. Appendix, Questions 12 and 45, infra.
76. For example, one respondent said that their clients’ “basic understanding of the UCC carried
the day” and that “no specific provision of the CISG was determinative of this decision.” Appendix,
Question 13, infra.
77. Id.
78. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
79. Appendix, Question 13, infra.
application of the CISG as the default body of law governing the transaction
when litigating or arbitrating cases where the parties’ contractual documents
were completely silent as to the Convention’s coverage.73
A general preference for the UCC was cited by 33% of the U.S.
participants for choosing to opt out of the CISG, followed by 31% who
indicated client preferences or desires motivated their decision, and 16% cited
their own lack of familiarity with the CISG as the reason for opting out of its
coverage.  While 20% indicated that they would opt out of the CISG because74
of concerns over specific provisions,  when asked to detail those specific75
concerns a strong generalized preference for the UCC (or other national law)
was still evident, rather than particularized concerns over the CISG.  For76
example, one participant simply indicated they wanted the “home field
advantage” of “Florida law,”  which goes back to the continuing confusion77
over the status of the CISG in our national law.  This is not just an issue for78
U.S. practitioners, as another respondent explained that they “prefer to have
the laws of Ontario and Canada govern” their commercial contracts, even
though Canada—like the U.S.—is also a contracting party to the CISG.79
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80. Appendix, Questions 13 and 45, infra.
81. See, e.g., Koehler, supra note 42, at 3-4.
82. These figures are based upon the 34 U.S. respondents who addressed the substance of this
question. Another 45 U.S. survey participants said that this particular question was not applicable to their
practice. See Appendix, Question 14 infra.
83. Appendix, Question 15, infra.
84. These figures are based upon the 34 U.S. respondents who addressed the substance of this
question. Another 45 U.S. survey participants said that this particular question was not applicable to their
practice. See Appendix, Question 14, infra.
85. These figures are based upon the 11 foreign respondents who addressed the substance of this
question. Another 8 foreign survey participants said that this particular question was not applicable to their
practice. See id.
Those who did identify specific issues that prompted their decision to opt
out of the CISG listed a mix of factors, some of which are associated with the
Convention itself but also several that are more properly associated with other
elements of national law. These included the timing of the “meeting of the
minds” and the negotiating processes, warranty exclusions, limitation periods,
and the role of gap fillers, and the relative lack of caselaw addressing the
interpretation to be given to the CISG’s various provisions.  This is consistent80
with other studies that found that U.S. practitioners were likely to exclude the
application of the CISG primarily because of their own lack of familiarity with
its terms and the absence of a significant body of caselaw providing further
guidance on its interpretation.81
Addressing the UNIDROIT Principles in Contracts
Most U.S. practitioners, 65%, do not address the UNIDROIT Principles
at all in their commercial contracts.  Nevertheless, none of the U.S.82
practitioners, and only one of the foreign practitioners had ever argued against
resorting to the UNIDROIT Principles when the parties’ contractual
documents were silent as to its application.83
Among U.S. practitioners who do address the Principles in their contracts,
15% choose to opt out, whereas 21% either specifically state their transactions
should be interpreted in accordance with the UNIDROIT Principles as a whole
or selectively invoke some portion of the Principles in their contractual
documents.  Foreign practitioners generally report greater use of the84
UNIDROIT Principles, with 45% incorporating some aspect of the Principles
in their contracts, and only 9% specifically opting out of their coverage.
However, again a large number of foreign practitioners, 45%, do not address
the UNIDROIT Principles in their contract documents at all.85
2008] INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTING PRACTICES SURVEY PROJECT 17
86. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
87. These figures are based upon the 18 U.S. respondents who addressed the substance of this
question. Another 69 U.S. survey participants said that they did not have occasion to litigate or arbitrate
international commercial disputes. See Appendix, Question 16, infra.
88. These figures are based upon the 8 U.S. respondents who addressed the substance of this
question. Another 66 U.S. survey participants said that they did not have occasion to litigate or arbitrate
international commercial disputes. See Appendix, Question 18, infra.
89. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
90. See Appendix, Questions 17 and 19, infra.
91. See id.
92. Appendix, Question 45, infra, Response from Practitioners.
Assessment of the Judiciary
While practitioners reported relatively low levels of familiarity of
regarding the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles for themselves,  their86
assessment of the judiciary’s level of familiarity with these instruments was
even lower.
Among those U.S. practitioners who litigate or arbitrate commercial
disputes, no one characterized the judiciary as “thoroughly familiar” with
these instruments, 72% felt the judiciary was “not at all familiar” with the
CISG,  and 88% believed the judiciary was similarly unfamiliar with the87
UNIDROIT Principles.  However, this is actually slightly less critical than88
the judiciary’s own self-assessment of its familiarity with these instruments.89
Interestingly, while foreign practitioners identified a real reluctance on the
part of the judiciary to apply the CISG or the UNIDROIT Principles to
international commercial disputes once they were brought to the judge’s
attention, the U.S. practitioners in most of the target jurisdictions did not
perceive this as an issue.  However, in Florida, as well as in other U.S.90
jurisdictions that were not principally targeted by the survey, practitioners
were generally equally split as to whether the judiciary was reluctant to apply
these instruments to disputes once they were presented, with use of the
UNIDROIT Principles being more problematic than the application of the
CISG.  One Florida practitioner noted that “[b]oth state court judges and most91
commercial litigators are simply unfamiliar with both the CISG and the
UNIDROIT principles.”92
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93. None of the judiciary in California, at either the state or federal level, participated in the survey.
Appendix, Question 2, infra, Response from Judiciary.
94. Id. Response from the Judiciary. This is also a significantly different attitude than Professor
Gordon encountered, where one Florida state judge responding to his survey said that he had no “printable”
comments to offer other then he was “strongly opposed to world government.” Gordon, supra note 3, at 369
n.30.
95. See, e.g., GPL Treatment, Ltd. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 894 P.2d 470 (Or. Ct. App. 1995),
aff’d, 914 P.2d 682 (Or. 1996). This Oregon case involved litigation over the “merchant’s exception” to
Oregon’s version of the UCC statute of frauds provision, UCC § 2-201, which the plaintiffs ultimately won
after closely divided decisions by both the Oregon Court of Appeals and Supreme Court. The dissent to the
Oregon Supreme Court’s opinion noted, however, that the question of the applicability of the CISG to the
dispute should have been addressed. 894 P.2d at 477 n.4 (Lesson, J., dissenting).
96. R. Brand, Professional Responsibility in a Transnational Transactions Practice: Must a Lawyer
Involved in a Negotiation or Litigation of a Contract Matter Be Aware of the Sales Convention?, 17 J.L.
Survey Part III: Questions Addressed to the Judiciary
There were very few responses from the judiciary, with only 17 judges
participating in the survey.  There are a number of possible reasons for the93
low response rate, not the least of which are the number of such requests
judges periodically receive, the press of other more immediate business before
the courts, or a reluctance to provide what some judges believed might appear
to be advisory opinions. However, more pertinently, several jurists indicated
that they declined to participate on the basis that they did not see cases
involving these instruments, and therefore would have little to add to the
survey. A staff member at the New York Court of Appeals strongly reiterated
this view, suggesting that it might be more likely that the federal courts would
see issues involving these instruments.
While this attitude might be surprising given the number of international
transactions conducted in New York, not to mention the common border that
state shares with Canada, it nevertheless again illustrates the pervasive
misimpression of the role of the CISG in our legal system, as well as the
judiciary’s fundamental dependence upon practitioners to properly frame the
issues brought before the courts. It also contrasts markedly with the comments
offered by a state judge in Montana who wrote that, “[i]n a county that borders
Canada, I need to know more about these principles. . . . Maybe I’ll hear more
on the subject and be prepared if I ever see the CISG and UNIDROIT
mentioned again!”  If litigants fail to focus on the applicable law, and judges94
are unaware of the scope of these instruments themselves, courts may
ultimately be left applying the wrong law to a case  resulting in a potential95
misuse of judicial resources and a professional responsibility exposure for
counsel.96
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& COM. 301, 335-36 (1998). Professor Dodge notes that the plaintiffs in GPL Treatment apparently raised
the issue of the applicability of the CISG, rather than the UCC, so late that the trial court ruled those
arguments were waived. He writes,
[i]t is likely that the delay in raising the applicability of the CISG was attributable to the
unfamiliarity of plaintiffs’ counsel with the CISG. The result was that the plaintiffs gave up an
argument that was a sure winner and were forced to rely instead upon the merchant’s exception to
the UCC statute of frauds, which presented a much closer question leading to two appeals and
presumably costing the plaintiffs a good deal more in attorney’s fees.
Dodge, supra note 3, at 75.
97. Appendix, Question 20, infra.
98. Appendix, Question 21, infra. This amounts to 17% of the 12 judges who addressed the
substance of this question. See Appendix, Question 2, infra, Response from the Judiciary.
99. Appendix, Question 23, infra. This amounts to 9% of the 11 judges who responded to the
substance of this question. See Appendix, Question 2, infra, Response from the Judiciary.
100. Appendix, Questions 22 and 24, infra. See also Appendix, Question 25, infra.
101. Appendix, Questions 26 and 27, infra.
102. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
Examining the responses that were received, however, shows that nearly
70% of those jurists participating in the survey had heard international
commercial disputes in their courts.  Even so, just two judges heard cases that97
mentioned the CISG,  and only one had dealt with the UNIDROIT98
Principles.  In each instance where one of these instruments was considered,99
the deciding factor in its application appears to be whether the parties to the
dispute specifically invoked either the CISG or the UNIDROIT Principles in
their contractual documents.  This further highlights the important role100
counsel plays in focusing the judiciary’s attention on these instruments, both
in drafting commercial agreements and in framing arguments in litigation.
The majority of the jurists participating in the survey said they did not
have a basis for assessing the familiarity of the practicing bar in their
jurisdiction with either the CISG or the UNIDROIT Principles. However,
judges in Florida, Montana, and New York were split as to whether the
practitioners in their jurisdictions were only “somewhat” or “not at all”
familiar with these instruments,  which is well below the practitioners own101
self-assessment of their knowledge of the CISG and the UNIDROIT
Principles.102
Survey Part IV: Questions Addressed to Law Professors
The sixty-four law professors participating in the survey reported teaching
a range of subjects and many, of course, teach multiple related courses. The
vast majority of the respondents, 87%, teach a basic Contracts course, and
41% teach a basic Sales course. Additionally, 36% teach advanced courses in
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103. Appendix, Question 28, infra.
104. One participant, or 2% of the applicable responses, reported addressing the UNIDROIT
Principles—but not the CISG—in a basic Contracts course. These figures are based upon the 50 U.S. law
professors who addressed the substance of this question. Another 5 U.S. law professors said that they did
not teach a basic Contracts course. See Appendix, Question 29, infra.
105. These figures are based upon the 38 U.S. law professors who addressed the substance of this
question. Another 14 U.S. survey participants said that they do not discuss the CISG or UNIDROIT
Principles in a basic Contracts course. In contrast, the foreign law professors all relied upon custom
materials they prepare themselves. See Appendix, Question 30, infra.
106. These figures are based upon the 39 U.S. law professors who addressed the substance of this
question. Another 13 U.S. survey participants said that they do not discuss the CISG in a basic Contracts
course. SeeAppendix, Question 31, infra.
107. This figure is based upon the 24 U.S. law professors who addressed the substance of this
question. Another 28 U.S. survey participants said that they do not discuss the UNIDROIT Principles in
a basic Contracts course. See Appendix, Question 32, infra.
108. One participant, or 4% of the applicable responses, reported addressing the UNIDROIT
Principles—but not the CISG—in a basic Sales course. These figures are based upon the 24 U.S. law
professors who addressed the substance of this question. Another 27 U.S. survey participants said that they
did not teach a basic Sales course. See Appendix, Question 33, infra.
109. These figures are based upon the 25 U.S. law professors who addressed the substance of this
question. Another 19 U.S. survey participants said that they do not discuss the CISG or UNIDROIT
International Business Transactions or related subjects, and 16% teach a
dedicated course on the CISG or International Sales.103
Covering the CISG or UNIDROIT Principles in Basic Contracts Courses
Among the U.S. law professors teaching a basic Contracts course, a
remarkable 78% address the CISG either alone or in conjunction with the
UNIDROIT Principles.  In doing so, 73% rely upon teaching materials found104
in a casebook, as opposed to preparing their own custom materials.  Of those105
who do discuss the CISG, most, 54%, only address the CISG “in passing,” but
46% do incorporate detailed reference to at least portions of the CISG at
various points in their Contracts courses.  But, 83% of the U.S. law106
professors surveyed who address the UNIDROIT Principles in a basic
Contracts course do so with only passing references.107
Covering the CISG or UNIDROIT Principles in Basic Sales Courses
Remarkably, 100% of the U.S. law professors teaching a basic Sales
course address the CISG either alone or in conjunction with the UNIDROIT
Principles.  Again, the vast majority doing so, 88%, rely upon teaching108
materials found in a casebook, as opposed to preparing their own custom
materials.  In Sales, in contrast to Contracts, however, 92% incorporate109
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Principles in a basic Sales course. See Appendix, Question 34, infra.
110. These figures are based upon the 24 U.S. law professors who addressed the substance of this
question. Another 21 U.S. survey participants said that they do not discuss the CISG in a basic Sales course.
See Appendix, Question 35, infra.
111. This figure is based upon the 9 U.S. law professors who addressed the substance of this question.
Another 34 U.S. survey participants said that they do not discuss the UNIDROIT Principles in a basic Sales
course. See Appendix, Question 36, infra.
112. See Gordon, supra note 3, at 364-67. However, it is also likely that there is a degree of self-
selection present among the law professors who chose to respond to these questions, which might inflate
the apparent level of support for including these instruments in basic law school courses.
113. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
114. Compare Dodge, supra note 3, at 76-77, with EDWARD J. MURPHY, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & IAN
AYRES, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW (Foundation Press ed., 6th ed. 2003); THOMAS D. CRANDALL &
DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS (Aspen Publishers ed., 4th ed.
2004); BRUCE W. FRIER & JAMES J. WHITE, THE MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS (Thomson West ed., 2d ed.
2005); JOHN EDWARDS MURRAY, JR., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (LexisNexis ed., 6th ed. 2006);
DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BRUCE A. MARKELL & LAWRENCE PONOROFF, MAKING AND DOING DEALS: CONTRACTS
IN CONTEXT (LexisNexis & Matthew Bender eds., 2d ed. 2006); CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL
& HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (Wolters Kluwer ed., Aspen
Publishers 2007). The CISG now also features prominently in some Sales casebooks, such as KRISTEN
DAVID ADAMS, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: A SURVEY OF UNITED STATES LAW WITH INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE (Thomson West ed., 2007) and BRYAN D. HULL, UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL SALES,
LEASE, AND LICENSING LAW: CASES AND PROBLEMS (Wolters Kluwer ed., Aspen Publishers 2007).
Additionally, another development has been the advent of casebooks specifically focused on the CISG such
as JOHN A. SPANOGLE & PETER WINSHIP, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A PROBLEM ORIENTED CASEBOOK
(West Group ed., 2000), and J.F. MORRISSEY & J.M. GRAVES, INTERNATIONAL SALES AND ARBITRATION:
PROBLEMS CASES AND COMMENTARY (forthcoming 2008).
115. These figures are based upon the 38 U.S. law professors who addressed the substance of this
question. Another 14 U.S. survey participants said that they do not discuss the CISG or UNIDROIT
Principles in a basic Contracts course. In contrast, the foreign law professors all relied upon custom
detailed reference to at least portions of the CISG at various points in the
course, with only 8% making a “passing” reference to the Convention.  But110
not unlike the minimal coverage given to the UNIDROIT Principles in
Contracts, two-thirds of the professors only make “passing” reference to the
Principles in their Sales courses.111
These figures suggest a substantial increase in the attention given by law
school faculty to the CISG and UNIDROIT Principles over what Professor
Gordon observed,  even though the overall level of awareness among112
academics was unchanged.  Moreover, formal coverage of the CISG and113
UNIDROIT Principles has recently improved in several casebooks, but their
inclusion is by no means universal or comprehensive.  Accordingly, it is also114
noteworthy that a decade ago none of the faculty reported addressing either
of these instruments if they were not already included in the casebooks they
were using with their courses, whereas in this survey only 26% of the U.S.
professors teaching Contracts  and 12% of those teaching Sales do so today115
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materials they prepare themselves. See Appendix, Question 30, infra.
116. These figures are based upon the 25 U.S. law professors who addressed the substance of this
question. Another 19 U.S. survey participants said that they do not discuss the CISG or UNIDROIT
Principles in a basic Sales course. See Appendix, Question 34, infra.
117. Examples of the additional materials now available include Professor Dodge’s excellent article,
Teaching the CISG in Contracts, and the cases, teaching notes, and other materials posted on his faculty
website. Dodge, supra note 3; Professor Dodge—Faculty Website, http://w3.uchastings.edu/dodge_01/
teaching_the_cisg.htm. Additionally, a more formal example of supplementary materials available in this
area includes J.A. Spanogle, M.P. Malloy, L.F. Del Duca, K.A. Rowley & A.K. Bjorklund, Global Issues
in Contract Law (Thomson West, 2007) (book review).
118. See Appendix, Question 37, infra. In comments to this question, two participants also mentioned
“risk of loss, exemption (Art. 79)” which is a significant topic. That topic was erroneously omitted from
the final draft of Question 37, and the omission from the list may, in part, account for it not having been
identified by more respondents. See id.
119. Appendix, Question 39, infra.
using custom materials.  This attests both to a greater level of interest on the116
part of individual faculty and the new availability of additional materials to
augment existing casebooks.117
Specific Topics Addressed in Basic Courses
The law professors were also asked to identify, from a list of possible
topics, what aspects of the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles they address
in these basic Contracts and Sales courses. As would be expected, this elicited
a wide range of responses which are detailed in the Appendix. However, more
than half of the respondents identified the following topics as among those
they would choose to address regarding the CISG:
• basic scope, coverage and purpose of the CISG (Arts. 1, 2, 3 & 6);
• contract formation and validity under the CISG (Art. 4);
• absence of a “parole evidence” rule under the CISG (Art. 8);
• lack of writing requirements and similar formalities under the CISG (Art. 11);
• offer and acceptance under the CISG (Art. 14);
• and “mirror image” and “last shot” rules under the CISG (Art. 19).118
In response to a similar question regarding the professors’ coverage of topics
related to the UNIDROIT Principles, there was much less consensus.
Nevertheless, more than half of the respondents indicated they would address
the impact and relationship of the UNIDROIT Principles to the CISG; and the
basic scope, coverage, and purpose of the UNIDROIT Principles under the
Preamble and Articles 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6.119
The professors who did not teach either the CISG or the UNIDROIT
Principles in their basic Contracts or Sales courses said that their omission
2008] INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTING PRACTICES SURVEY PROJECT 23
120. “The importance of other topics that need to be covered” was cited by 72% of those who did not
teach the CISG; and by 57% of those who did not address the UNIDROIT Principles in their courses. See
Appendix, Questions 38 and 40, infra.
121. The “preference that ‘international’ course cover these subjects” was cited by 22% of those who
do not teach the CISG, and their own lack of familiarity was identified as a reason by 17% of those
professors. Appendix, Question 38, infra. With regard to those professors who do not address the
UNIDROIT Principles, only 17% identified a “preference that ‘international’ course cover these subjects”
as the reason while 46% cited their own lack of familiarity with the topic—making that reason second only
to the time pressures faced in covering all the required material. Appendix, Question 40, infra.
122. At 31%, the absence of suitable casebook materials was the third most cited reason for
professors not addressing the UNIDROIT Principles in their courses. See Appendix, Questions 38 and 40,
infra.
123. This figure is based upon the 28 U.S. law professors who addressed the substance of this
question. An equal number, another 28 U.S. survey participants, said that they do not have occasion to form
an opinion as to the bar’s familiarity with the CISG. See Appendix, Question 41, infra.
124. This figure is based upon the 19 U.S. law professors who addressed the substance of this
question. Another 36 U.S. survey participants said that they do not have occasion to form an opinion as to
the bar’s familiarity with the UNIDROIT Principles. See Appendix, Question 42, infra.
125. Appendix, Question 3, infra, Response from Practitioners.
126. Appendix, Question 4, infra, Response from Practitioners.
127. This figure is based upon the 18 U.S. law professors who addressed the substance of this
question. Another 39 U.S. survey participants said that they do not have occasion to form an opinion as to
was primarily due to the lack of time to cover these topics along with the other
subjects the professors felt should be included in their courses.  Secondary120
reasons included a preference that “international” courses cover these subjects
and the professors’ own lack of familiarity with the CISG or the Principles.121
The lack of teaching materials in the professors’ preferred casebook was not
an issue regarding the CISG, unlike what Professor Gordon found, but was
seen as a definite issue with regard to the UNIDROIT Principles.122
Assessment of the Bar and Judiciary
U.S. law professors felt that 65% of the practicing bar in their jurisdiction
was “somewhat” or “moderately” familiar with the CISG,  and 32% would123
be similarly familiar with the UNIDROIT Principles.  Thus, it appears that124
the law professors are a bit more generous in their opinion than the
practitioners own self assessment, where 44% said they were “not at all
familiar” with the CISG,  but pretty close to the practitioners self-assessment125
regarding the UNIDROIT Principles where 63% of the bar said they were “not
at all familiar” with the Principles.  The U.S. law professors were even more126
generous in assessing the judiciary’s familiarity with these instruments. The
academics felt that 56% of the bench in their jurisdiction was “somewhat” or
“moderately” familiar with the CISG,  and 39% would be similarly familiar127
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the judiciary’s familiarity with the CISG. See Appendix, Question 43, infra.
128. This figure is based upon the 18 U.S. law professors who addressed the substance of this
question. Another 38 U.S. survey participants said that they do not have occasion to form an opinion as to
the bar’s familiarity with the UNIDROIT Principles. See Appendix, Question 44, infra.
129. Question 3, infra, Response from the Judiciary.
130. Appendix, Question 4, infra, Response from the Judiciary.
131. See supra notes 43-44, 74, 92 and accompanying text.
132. See Appendix, Question 45, infra.
133. It should also be noted that other practitioners from New York were strongly in favor of the need
to learn more about these instruments. For example, another New York practitioner wrote, “[t]here needs
to be much more education (CLE) for practitioners such as myself, who [practice] in the cross [border]
contracts area but are almost totally unfamiliar with the CISG and UNIDROIT.” Id.
with the UNIDROIT Principles.  According to the judges own self128
assessment, 82% said they were “not at all familiar” with the CISG,  and129
88% of the bench said they were “not at all familiar” with the UNIDROIT
Principles.  Perhaps the professors have an unduly high opinion of the130
impact and effectiveness of their teaching in this area?
Survey Part V: Comments
The survey closed with an open end question soliciting further comments
or observations. Most of the individual comments that pertain to particular
subjects are incorporated into the other portions of this report.131
One consistent theme that appears out of the remaining comments,
however, is the need and desire for further education on the CISG and
UNIDROIT Principles, which was cited by commentators from each group;
practitioners, jurists, and legal academics.  Even so, three practitioners and132
one law professor, interestingly all from New York, offered comments
arguably suggesting that they question whether there was much need to
consider or learn about these instruments. Their comments also illustrate, yet
again, the pervasive misconception of the CISG as something separate and
apart from the body of U.S. contract law. The three practitioners wrote:
[1] I have just returned from a conference of European lawyers and I have attended
three conference[s] of that group in the past year. I find it very interesting that I
do not recall anyone mentioning these items, which may be an indication that they
are of very limited application;
[2] Have not run into either CISG or UNIDROIT in my practice except for occasional
choice of law clauses disclaiming their applicability; and,
[3] CISG and UNIDROIT are not covered in most traditional law school curricula.
They may be accessed online if needed, and are taught in CLE programs and
webinars.133




137. See Gordon, supra note 3, at 365, 374.
138. See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
The New York law professor offered a more forceful statement:
I am reasonably confident that most American practitioners would prefer to blot the
CISG out of their consciousness. If you are going to deal cross-border in a serious way
you will need local counsel to advise you about the many features of the [other] country’s
laws that aren’t governed by the CISG—e.g. bankruptcy, procedure for enforcement,
security interests, etc. If you have local counsel anyway why bother with the CISG?134
Contrast these statements to comments received from yet another
practitioner and law professor, from the other top exporting states, Florida and
California. The Florida practitioner observed: “Business people and their
attorneys need to understand that the CISG may apply unless they specifically
exclude it. The word needs to get out.”  The California law professor offered135
an opinion on the value of these instruments from both an academic and
practical perspective:
It is extremely important, I think, and I have been teaching students about the CISG and
UNIDROIT Principles since their inception (and even before, since I’ve also talked about
their predecessors) . . . that students be knowledgeable about these important areas of
commercial practice. I also use these materials to teach students about applicable law and
choice of law and other private international law doctrines that are too often overlooked
in today’s American law schools. I believe it is important that students learn even while
1-Ls that it is important to ask the PIL questions, to recognize that more than one law or
set of laws might apply in a given case. Students need to internalize this insight early on,
and not relegate it to the “exceptional” field of international law, which for many is
simply not relevant to them (or so they think).136
 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
It takes time for established practices to adapt and change; there is a “lag
time” between the promulgation of non-mandatory legal rules and their
widespread reception or use in practice.  However, the CISG was137
incorporated into U.S. domestic law nearly twenty years ago, and the
UNIDROIT Principles are now more than a decade old, and they are both still
largely unknown and seldom seen in practice today.138
Many practitioners who are aware of these tools, nevertheless
misconceive their impact and import. The CISG, in particular, continues to be
26 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 27:1
139. See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 32-34, 108-17 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
143. These figures are based upon 2006 figures, where the top ten trading partners accounted for
$1.896 trillion of the $2.892 worth of trade in goods conducted that year. See U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign
Trade Statistics, Top Trading Partners—Total Trade, Year to Date, December, 2006, http://www.census
.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top0612.html.
144. See id.
145. See id. In 2006, total trade in goods with our number one trading partner, Canada, amounted to
$534 billion; with our second ranked trading partner, China, it amounted to $343 billion; and with our third
ranked trading partner, Mexico, it amounted to $332.4 billion. Id.
146. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
adversely affected by a misimpression that it is “foreign” law, something
distinct and separate from the law of contract applied here in the United
States, and therefore can be ignored or dispensed with in favor of the more
familiar rules of the common law and the UCC.  As a consequence, the139
judiciary is even less familiar with these tools than are practitioners.  Legal140
academics are becoming more attuned to the CISG and the UNIDROIT
Principles and the issues they pose, but could do more to help educate the
bench and bar.141
Taking a naive or cavalier approach to the CISG can be quite problematic.
While the CISG is certainly part of the body of international or “foreign” law,
as a ratified treaty it is also an integral part of contract law in the U.S. and by
its own terms provides the default rules applicable to international transactions
within its scope. One does not need to “opt in” to its coverage.  This is not142
a trivial point. Just ten nations account for two-thirds of all trade in goods
conducted by the United States.  Eight of those ten are CISG contracting143
states, including both our NAFTA partners, Canada and Mexico, and our
leading overseas trading partner, China.  These three countries alone144
accounted for $1.2 trillion out of a total $2.9 trillion in U.S. trade in goods in
2006, or over 40% of trade for the year.  If the sorts of volumes generated145
by trade with the entire CISG membership, and the thousands upon thousands
of transactions they represent, are extended back over the nearly twenty years
the CISG has been in effect for the United States, it is beyond mind-boggling
that the CISG only appears in as few as 56 reported U.S. cases.  Given the146
low level of general awareness of the CISG, it is reasonable to assume that
there are a significant number of commercial disputes where the CISG should
apply, but where it is not being properly considered by either the bar or the
bench.
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147. See supra notes 70, 71 and accompanying text.
148. In the international context, where each of the purported contracting parties may come from legal
regimes with differing substantive laws, one might also add the problem of choosing the correct “conflict
of laws” (or what is sometimes called “private international law”) principles in order to help determine
which party’s substantive contract law might apply to resolve these questions. This can transform the “battle
of the forms” into an almost circular problem—creating the sort of irreconcilable issues much beloved by
legal academics teaching in this field—where the substantive law to be applied depends upon the choice
of law, but where the choice of law may depend upon the applicable substantive law. The stated aims of
the CISG included promoting the “adoption of uniform rules which govern contracts for the international
sale of goods [which took] into account the different social, economic and legal systems [so as to]
contribute to the removal of legal barriers in international trade,” and thereby avoid or minimize the added
complications introduced by differing substantive legal rules in such circumstances. See CISG, supra note
1, at Preamble. Whether the CISG’s rules accomplish this aim in the context of the “battle of the forms”
is debatable. See, e.g., Sukurs, supra note 3. See also COMMENTARY ON UN CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 232-45 (P. Schlectriem & I. Schwenzer eds., 2d ed., Oxford 2005).
149. The Restatement summarizes the common law “mirror image” rule in §§ 39 and 59.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 39, 59. The UCC then rejected the common law “mirror
image” rule, and its corollary the “last shot doctrine,” regarding the terms of contracts formed when
accepted by performance, in its battle of the forms provision:
Additional terms in acceptance or confirmation.
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent
within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or
different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on
assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract. Between
merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable time
after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish
a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such
case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties
agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.
UCC § 2-207.
When Article 2 was revised in 2003, the drafters continued to reject the common law approach and
Moreover, even the minority of practitioners who are aware of the
Convention, but wish to opt out of its coverage,  cannot blithely avoid the147
CISG altogether by simply using a choice of law clause. The effectiveness of
a clause excluding the Convention depends upon whether a contract is actually
formed, and whether the choice of law clause is among the terms of that
contract.  These are the issues that classically lie at the heart of the “battle148
of the forms,” a problem that the common law, the UCC, and the CISG (along
with the UNIDROIT Principles) all approach slightly differently, and
consequently different results can be reached in any given case depending
upon what properly is the applicable law.  Accordingly, whether included as149
28 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 27:1
specified in Revised UCC 2-206(3) that “[a] definite and seasonable expression of acceptance in a record
operates as an acceptance even if it contains terms additional to or different from the offer,” but altered the
mechanism of 2-207 to remove any implicit preference for either the offeror’s or offeree’s form in such
circumstances. The drafters of Revised Article 2 also specifically declined to take any position on how to
handle the “terms in a box” problem which prompted Judge Easterbrook’s rolling contract theory.
In contrast, the CISG, which also recognizes contract formation by conduct in Article 18, employs a
variation of the approach found in the common law:
(1) A reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains additions, limitations or
other modifications is a rejection of the offer and constitutes a counter-offer.
(2) However, a reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains additional or
different terms which do not materially alter the terms of the offer constitutes an acceptance, unless
the offeror, without undue delay, objects orally to the discrepancy or dispatches a notice to that
effect. If he does not so object, the terms of the contract are the terms of the offer with the
modifications contained in the acceptance.
(3) Additional or different terms relating, among other things, to the price, payment, quality and
quantity of the goods, place and time of delivery, extent of one party’s liability to the other or the
settlement of disputes are considered to alter the terms of the offer materially.
CISG, supra note 1, Art. 19.
Finally, the UNIDROIT Principles mechanism, which similarly recognizes contract formation by
conduct in Article 2.1.11, provides:
(1) A reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains additions, limitations or
other modifications is a rejection of the offer and constitutes a counter-offer.
(2) However, a reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains additional or
different terms which do not materially alter the terms of the offer constitutes an acceptance, unless
the offeror, without undue delay, objects to the discrepancy. If the offeror does not object, the terms
of the contract are the terms of the offer with the modifications contained in the acceptance.
UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 2, at Art. 2.1.11.
150. See, e.g., Sukurs, supra note 3, at 1484-92; Dodge, supra note 3, at 82-85. See also, e.g.,
Travelers Prop. Cas. Co., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (D. Minn. 2007). But cf. Comerica Bank v. Whitehall
Specialties, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
151. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
152. See Cook, supra note 42, at 263.
153. For example, Koehler notes that the 2002 revision of Germany’s Law of Obligations was largely
based upon the CISG. See Koehler, supra note 42, at notes 15 and 16 and accompanying text.
a routine part of a standard form, or in a custom contract, it is by no means
certain that an attempt to “opt out” of the CISG’s coverage with such a choice
of law clause will be effective.150
Entirely apart from the effectiveness of such a clause, whether it is
prudent to routinely attempt to opt out of the CISG’s coverage is also
debatable. The primary motivation for doing so appears to be a lack or
familiarity with the CISG rather than a reasoned analysis of whether opting
out serves particular client interests.  This tendency towards what some151
describe as legal ethnocentricity  is particularly striking given that the CISG152
not only provides the default rules for so many international transactions, but
has come to serve as a model for the domestic commercial law in other nations
with which we trade  and is even applied in many cases to which it is not153
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154. See Yang, CISG in China and Beyond, and The Application of the CISG the Current PRC Law
and CIETAC Arbitration Practice, supra note 8.
155. Many of these differences are now being addressed in the various courses taught in law school.
See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. See also Dodge, supra note 3. See generally supra note
114 and the referenced materials.
156. The UCC provision reads:
Buyer’s Rights on Improper Delivery.
Subject to the provisions of this Article on breach in installment contracts (Section 2-612) and
unless otherwise agreed under the sections on contractual limitations of remedy (Sections 2-718
and 2-719), if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract,
the buyer may
• (a) reject the whole; or
• (b) accept the whole; or
• (c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest.
UCC § 2-601.
157. The UCC provision reads:
Cure by Seller of Improper Tender or Delivery; Replacement.
(1) Where any tender or delivery by the seller is rejected because non-conforming and the time
for performance has not yet expired, the seller may seasonably notify the buyer of his intention
strictly applicable. Professor Albert Kritzer, the Executive Secretary of the
Pace University Law School’s Institute of International Commercial Law
which hosts the Electronic Database on the CISG, notes that U.S.
practitioners’ tendency to automatically opt out of the CISG in cases where it
would ordinarily apply stands in marked contrast to what is happening in
China, our largest overseas trading partner. Professor Kritzer’s study of the
Chinese arbitration awards reported in the Pace database suggest that, in
China, some parties or tribunals opt in to the CISG when it would not
otherwise apply by its terms.154
Furthermore, ignoring the tools provided by the CISG does not
necessarily guarantee the best outcome for a U.S. client. The CISG differs
from the common law and the UCC in a number of areas, not only with regard
to the “battle of the forms,” but also in the absence of contract formalities
such as those related to the statute of frauds or the parol evidence rule, the
manner and timing of the effectiveness of communications, and in remedies
which emphasize specific performance and measure damages in a different
fashion, for instance.155
An example that helps highlight why an unthinking exclusion of the CISG
might disadvantage a U.S. party is the CISG’s absence of a perfect tender rule.
If a U.S. seller in an international transaction relies upon UCC Article 2,
instead of the CISG, the buyer may reject the delivery if it “fails in any
respect,” however minor, to conform to the contract.  While the UCC may156
also provide the U.S. seller with an opportunity to cure the discrepancy,  the157
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to cure and may then within the contract time make a conforming delivery.
(2) Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender which the seller had reasonable grounds
to believe would be acceptable with or without money allowance the seller may if he seasonably
notifies the buyer have a further reasonable time to substitute a conforming tender.
UCC § 2-508.
158. The CISG provision reads:
(1) The buyer may declare the contract avoided:
(a) if the failure by the seller to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this
Convention amounts to a fundamental breach of contract[.]
CISG, supra note 1, Art. 49(1)(a).
The CISG has a similar provision that applies when the buyer is in breach, which reads:
(1) The seller may declare the contract avoided:
(a) if the failure by the buyer to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this
Convention amounts to a fundamental breach of contract[.]
Id. at Art. 64(1)(a). Additionally, under the “Nachfrist” procedure, which was borrowed from German law,
in the event of a non-fundamental breach the non-breaching party may set an additional reasonable time
for the breaching party to perform. If performance is still not forthcoming, the contract may be avoided. See
id. at Arts. 49(1)(b); 64(1)(b).
159. The CISG provides:
A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results in such detriment
to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract,
unless the party in breach did not foresee, and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same
circumstances would not have foreseen, such a result.
Id. at Art. 25.
160. The CISG approach has much in common with the common law doctrine of substantial
performance. Dodge, supra note 3, at 91. Professor Dodge notes Karl Llewellyn’s criticism of the perfect
tender rule because of the possibilities it creates for opportunistic behavior by buyers in a falling
commodities market, while pointing out that a substantial performance rule also creates the possibility of
opportunistic behavior on the part of sellers. See id. and Karl Llewyelln, On Warranty of Quality, and
Society, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 341, 378, 389 (1937).
buyer’s rejection defeats or postpones contract formation and may create a
host of interrelated problems regarding customs duties, letters of credit, third
party obligations, etc. The CISG, in contrast, requires the buyer to accept and
pay for the goods in such circumstances thereby forming a contract,  albeit158
one that is subject to the buyer’s claim for appropriate compensation, unless
the seller’s breach is fundamental to the transaction.  Given the infinite159
variety of minor hiccups that can plague transactions conducted at a distance,
and particularly in transborder dealings, it might well generally be more to the
seller’s advantage to use the default CISG rule rather than insisting upon the
UCC, whether in a large custom contract or the seller’s routine boilerplate
agreements.  Similarly, U.S. buyers (and sellers) may prefer relying upon160
CISG’s broader rights to require specific performance and insist that contract
obligations be completed, rather than looking to the common law and the UCC
where specific performance is only available if the substitute remedy of
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161. The UCC provision on the availability of specific performance to buyers reads:
Buyer’s Right to Specific Performance or Replevin.
(1) Specific performance may be decreed where the goods are unique or in other proper
circumstances.
(2) The decree for specific performance may include such terms and conditions as to payment
of the price, damages, or other relief as the court may deem just.
(3) The buyer has a right of replevin for goods identified to the contract if after reasonable effort
he is unable to effect cover for such goods or the circumstances reasonably indicate that such
effort will be unavailing or if the goods have been shipped under reservation and satisfaction
of the security interest in them has been made or tendered.
UCC § 2-716.
This contrasts with the CISG provisions governing the rights afforded buyers which reads:
(1) The buyer may require performance by the seller of his obligations unless the buyer has resorted
to a remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement.
(2) If the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer may require delivery of substitute goods
only if the lack of conformity constitutes a fundamental breach of contract and a request for
substitute goods is made either in conjunction with notice given under article 39 or within a
reasonable time thereafter.
(3) If the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer may require the seller to remedy the
lack of conformity by repair, unless this is unreasonable having regard to all the circumstances.
A request for repair must be made either in conjunction with notice given under article 39 or within
a reasonable time thereafter.
CISG, supra note 1, Art. 46.
The equivalent provision in the UCC governing the seller’s right to specific performance reads:
Action for the Price.
(1) When the buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes due the seller may recover, together with
any incidental damages under the next section, the price
(a) of goods accepted or of conforming goods lost or damaged within a commercially
reasonable time after risk of their loss has passed to the buyer; and
(b) of goods identified to the contract if the seller is unable after reasonable effort to resell
them at a reasonable price or the circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort will be
unavailing.
(2) Where the seller sues for the price he must hold for the buyer any goods which have been
identified to the contract and are still in his control except that if resale becomes possible he
may resell them at any time prior to the collection of the judgment. The net proceeds of any such
resale must be credited to the buyer and payment of the judgment entitles him to any goods not
resold.
(3) After the buyer has wrongfully rejected or revoked acceptance of the goods or has failed to
make a payment due or has repudiated (Section 2-610), a seller who is held not entitled to the
price under this section shall nevertheless be awarded damages for non-acceptance under the
preceding section.
UCC § 2-709.
Again this contrasts with the seller’s rights under the CISG provision, which reads: “The seller may
require the buyer to pay the price, take delivery or perform his other obligations, unless the seller has
resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement.” CISG, supra note 1, Art. 62. It should
be noted, however, that the CISG significantly limits the availability of specific performance when that
remedy would be restricted under other national laws:
If, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, one party is entitled to require performance
monetary damages is inadequate.  Accordingly, rather than acting on a161
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of any obligation by the other party, a court is not bound to enter a judgment for specific
performance unless the court would do so under its own law in respect of similar contracts of sale
not governed by this Convention.
Id. at Art. 28. This provision does not actually mandate that courts looking to U.S. law deny specific
performance, absent unique goods being at issue, but it does provide the basis for arguing that a refusal to
grant specific performance would not violate the terms of the CISG. Alternatively, one might also argue that
the CISG approach might be more advantageous to parties seeking specific performance in common law
jurisdictions, if they simply specify the “proper circumstances” under which the remedy could be invoked.
See Magellan International Corporation v. Salzgitter Handel GmbH, 76 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Ill. 1999);
see also Dodge, supra note 3, at 90.
162. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
163. See Brand, supra note 96, at 335-36.
164. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
166. In 2006, total trade in goods with our number one trading partner, Canada, amounted to $534
billion; and with our third ranked trading partner, Mexico, it amounted to $332.4 billion. U.S. Census
Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics, Top Trading Partners—Total Trade, Exports, Imports, Year-to-Date
December 2006, Total Trade (Goods), Total, All Trade, available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/statistics/highlights/top/top0612.html.
simplistic desire to “blot out” the CISG from one’s consciousness,  an162
informed and rational determination is required as to what best serves the
client’s needs and interests. As Professor Ronald Brand notes, the failure to
understand and properly apply the CISG in circumstances where the
Convention applies is a clear violation of the requirement contained in the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct that a lawyer possess and exercise “the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation necessary for the
representation” of a client, and therefore constitutes malpractice.163
Given our adversarial system, and the judiciary’s dependence upon the
bar to properly present the issues and the applicable law, it’s not surprising
that jurists are even less familiar with these instruments than are the
practitioners. Nevertheless, the limited data available suggests that the
judiciary is also affected by the persistent misimpression of the CISG as
something separate and apart from U.S. law, and of concern only in occasional
large custom transactions.  In actuality, the Montana state court judge’s164
intuitive sense that the CISG might be applicable to many smaller and routine
cross-border commercial disputes is probably more correct,  especially given165
the $860+ billion annual trade conducted with our contiguous NAFTA
partners  not to mention the countless small value individual goods166
transactions being concluded with trading partners around the world by both
traditional means and at least partially over the Internet.
In contrast, the UNIDROIT Principles actually are separate and distinct
from domestic law, and therefore it’s not at all surprising that the Principles
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167. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
168. INCOTERMS are standard definitions of international commercial terms, such as FOB or CIF,
published by the International Chamber of Commerce’s Commission on Commercial Law and Practice.
INCOTERMS are typically incorporated by reference in many international sale contracts. See International
Chamber of Commerce, INCOTERMS 2000 (ICC Publication No. 560) 1999.
169. The UCP, or Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, are privately formulated
rules, derived from custom and usage, for handling letters of credit published by the International Chamber
of Commerce. They are typically incorporated by reference in many international contracts. See
International Chamber of Commerce, UCP 600 (ICC Publication No. 600) 2007.
170. See, e.g., Charles N. Brower & Jeremy K. Sharpe, The Creeping Codification of Transnational
Commercial Law: An Arbitrator’s Perspective, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 199 (2004); Fabrizio Marrella, Choice
of Law in Third-Millennium Arbitrations: The Relevance of the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1137 (2003).
171. See Michael J. Bonell, Soft Law and Party Autonomy: The Case of the UNIDROIT Principles,
51 LOY. L. REV. 229 (2005).
172. Professor Bonell notes:
Parties wishing to have their contract governed by the UNIDROIT Principles refer to them as the
sole lex contractus or in conjunction with a particular domestic law, which may have the role of
supplementing the Principles in the case of gaps or, on the contrary, of being the law primarily
governing the contract with the Principles relegated to a means of merely interpreting or
supplementing it. Contrary to domestic courts, which are traditionally reluctant to grant parties the
right to choose international principles and rules as the law governing the contract in lieu of a
particular domestic law, arbitrators are generally permitted, at least in the context of international
disputes, to base their decisions on soft law instruments such as the UNIDROIT Principles.
See Bonell, supra note 171, at 251-52.
173. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
are even more seldom used by judges and practitioners than is the case with
the CISG.  However, even though the Principles embody “soft law” and167
function best as a non-binding normative instrument that attempts to construct
a single unified body of contract rules from a number of legal systems, they
can be voluntarily invoked by the parties to any international transaction as is
done with INCOTERMS  or the UCP  for example, although this occurs168 169
primarily in arbitration.  In this manner, the Principles can serve170
practitioners and jurists alike as an international restatement of the law of
contract.  More work, however, needs to be done to identify and document171
their utility in that context.172
Legal academia has generally become much more aware of both the CISG
and the UNIDROIT principles in the ten years since Professor Gordon
conducted his survey.  Materials addressing these instruments are more173
readily available, and they are being included by authors in casebooks even for
first year courses.  However, while more professors are including the CISG174
and the UNIDROIT Principles in their courses, it will take time for the
students who are now being introduced to these instruments in law school to
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make an impact in practice and in the courts. Indeed, all of us in academia
should be cautious about the success of these efforts, as it appears we are
substantially overrating both the bench’s and bars’ own familiarity and
comfort with these instruments.175
In sum, while the CISG and UNIDROIT Principles provide numerous
concepts and rules that could be of use in serving client interests, they are
being underutilized. Moreover, they are being underutilized not because of a
conscious selection of a “better” rule or approach found in the common law
or the UCC. Rather, they are being ignored either because of outright
ignorance or because these instruments are simply unfamiliar and
perceived—correctly (in the case of the UNIDROIT Principles) or quite
incorrectly (in the case of the CISG)—as “foreign” law. The CISG is, and
should be recognized as, the default law for a vast number international
commercial transactions involving U.S. parties. The persistent failure to do so
is neither professional nor good lawyering, and may well constitute
malpractice. In the era of globalization, an era that international trade helped
foster and create, legal ethnocentricity has no legitimate role. American
lawyers, be they practitioners, jurists, or academics, need to be more aware of
the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles.
